An empirical analysis of mandatory valuation allowance change in China: an accounting choice and valuation study. by Chen, Chang. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Business Administration.
An Empirical Analysis of Mandatory Valuation Allowance 
Change in China: An Accounting Choice 
and Valuation Study 
CHEN Chang 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Philosophy 
in 
Accountancy 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
September 2001 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong holds the copyright of this thesis. Any 
pers is(s) intending to use a part or whole of the materials in the thesis in a 
proposed publication must seek copyright release from the Dean of the Graduate 
School. 
i 
ti 1 1 UPR m 1 
An Empirical Analysis of Mandatory Valuation Allowance Change in China: An 
Accounting Choice and Value-relevance Study 
Abstract 
This paper examines the accounting choices and value-relevance issues arising 
from a mandated accounting change in the emerging market of China. This mandated 
policy change requires listed Chinese firms to make allowances of four specified 
assets and thus make accounting book values better reflect their economic values. I 
specifically examine two research questions: 1) why did some firms voluntarily adopt 
this earnings and assets decreasing accounting change earlier in 1998 than mandated 
adoption year? and 2) Is the information provided under the "Four Valuation 
Allowances" rule value-relevant? Consistent with “big bath" phenomenon in prior 
western literature, firms with losses and failing to meet 10% ROE requirements for 
rights offering by the CSRC are more likely to adopt the income-decreasing 
accounting policy voluntarily earlier in 1998. Management change is another 
motivation for the early adoption. Empirical evidence also shows that information 
provided under the newly issued accounting policy are value relevant to investors. 
Furthermore, this new policy provides incremental value-relevant information over 
the old rule. These findings not only enrich the extant value-relevance accounting 
literature on listed Chinese firms but also provide useful insights to standard setters to 
assess relevance and reliability of this new accounting policy. In addition, this study 
sheds light on how Chinese managers make discretionary accounting decisions and 
how investors value such information. 
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對中國强制性减値準備會計政策變更之實證分析：會計 
選擇及價値相關性之硏究 
摘 要 
本文對中國新興市場中由一强制性會計變更而弓丨發的會計選擇及價値相關 
性問題進行了探討。該强制性會計變更要求中國上市公司對指定的四項資産計 
提减値準備’以使得會計帳面價値更加公允地反映其經濟價値。我具體硏究了 
兩個問題：一 ’爲什麽部分公司會自願地在1998年采用此降低帳面資産和會 
計盈餘的新政策？ 二，在“四項計提”政策要求下提供的會計信息是否具有價 
値相關性？與早前西方文獻中提到的“大沖洗”現象一致，磨損公司及未達 
到10%淨資産收益率而無配股權的公司更傾向于提早自願采取此降低盈餘的會 
計變更。公司管理層變更也是另外一個主要動因。實證結果還表明新近公布的 
“四項計提”政策所要求提供的會計信息對投資者具有價値相關性。而且較之 
舊的會計政策，該政策下提供的增量信息也同樣價値相關。這些發現不僅豐富 
了現有的中國上市公司會計信息價値相關性的硏究，幷且還給政策制定者提供 
了有用的信息以便他們對該政策的相關性和可靠性進行評估。此外，該硏究也 
揭示了中國上市公司經理人員如何制訂自主性會計决策，而投資者又如何評估 
這些信息。 
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An Empirical Analysis of Mandatory Valuation Allowance Change in China: An 
Accounting Choice and Valuation Study 
1. Introduction 
This study investigates accounting choices and value-relevance issues arising 
from a significant accounting policy change, namely, “Four Valuation Allowances" 
policy, in the emerging market of China. Firstly, I examine motivations driving firms' 
voluntary adoption of this earnings-decreasing accounting method. Secondly, I test 
the value-relevance of the information provided under the newly issued policy. 
For past two decades, Chinese stock market has grown rapidly since the PRC 
government reactivated the stock markets in early 1990s (see Table 1). Accordingly, 
Chinese accounting professions and government have responded to the trend with the 
enactment of a number of new accounting regulations to meet the increasing demand 
for information of capital market participants. In January 1998, Accounting System for 
Shareholding Companies was promulgated which includes "Four Valuation 
Allowance" policy\ For the first time, listed Chinese companies are permitted to 
exercise discretion in selection accounting methods and making accounting estimates. 
Managers are allowed to use their own judgment to make allowances for accounts 
receivables, inventory, short-term investments and long-term investments. This is the 
most significant change for accounting reporting system in China. 
One of the most significant differences between Chinese GAAP and IAS has 
been the valuation allowances for assets such as short-term and long-term 
investments, accounts receivables, and inventories. Before 1998, valuation allowances 
were not required for short-term and long-term investments and inventories, and the 
1 Four valuation allowances are，namely, allowance for bad debt, allowance for market deduction of 
inventory, allowance for market deduction of short-term investment and allowance for market 
deduction of long-term investment. 
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allowance for doubtfial accounts was limited to the range of 0.3-0.5% of the total 
accounts receivable under the rules of Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises. 
These restrictions deviate accounting book values from their economic values greatly 
and hence limit the usefulness of accounting information. To make the book value of 
four specified assets^ better reflect their economic values, the Chinese Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) promulgated the Accounting System for Shareholding Companies: 
Accounts and Financial Statements (MOF, NO. 7, 1998) in January 1998. It requires 
firms listed in overseas and those issued H-shares and B-shares to select methods and 
percentages of allowances for the four specified assets from the 1998 fiscal year. Yet 
A-share companies are allowed to follow this policy voluntarily in 1998. In 1999, 
MOF promulgated Supplementary Provision of Accounting System for Shareholding 
Companies: Accounts and Financial Statements {MOF, No.35 & No.49，1999)， 
requiring all shareholding companies to adopt the "Four Valuation Allowances" policy 
from the year of 1999 (see Appendix 1). 
This accounting policy change dramatically influenced the Chinese listed 
firms' financial reporting in that both the net assets and earnings are reduced through 
this mandatory accounting method change. Retroactive method is allowed to record 
the cumulative effects for prior years as a reduction of the beginning balance of 
retained earnings in the adoption year. The following new article sheds light on the 
impact of the accounting change: 
"One of the major influences to the financial reporting of Chinese listed firms in 
1999 is the implementation of "Four Valuation Allowances" policy. Although 
the retroactive adjustments reduce the impact to current year's financial 
performance of listed companies, it is an unavoidable reality that the assets and 
shareholder's equity "shrink" greatly. Statistics show that the "shrinkage" of the 
2 The four specified assets are accounts receivable, inventory and short-term and long-term 
investments. 
3 The assets valuation allowances allow only for market deduction so that its effect to financial 
reporting is assets and earning decreasing only. 
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assets is up to 41.8 billion RMB, which is equal to 2.57% of total assets of 
Chinese listed firms, and 5.36% of total shareholder's equity at ending balance 
of 1998. {Shanghai Securities News, May 10, 2000)" 
Since the adoption of the "Four Valuation Allowances" policy will only 
decrease earnings and assets rather than increase them, it is interesting to investigate 
why firms voluntarily adopted this accounting change earlier. The answer to this first 
research question will shed light on motivations of managerial accounting choices of 
listed Chinese firms, which is rarely studied in extant literature on China. The second 
research question on the value-relevance of the new allowance information 
contributes existing accounting literature in the following ways. First, prior value-
relevance studies mainly focus on the summary measures, such as earnings and cash 
flows (e.g. Haw，Qi，and Wu, 1998b; Haw, Qi，and Wu, 1999; Li, 2001). Value-
relevance of specific items in balance sheet and income statements are seldom 
investigated. This study enriches the Chinese capital market study by investigating 
value-relevance of specific financial statement items such as allowances of accounts 
receivable and bad debt expenses. Second, since Chinese capital market is an 
emerging market, the sophistication level of Chinese investors remains a controversial 
issue to be explored. This study can also shed light on whether and how Chinese 
investors use accounting information. Third, by investigating the management 
motivation and value-relevance of the new accounting policy change, this study will 
also provide useful information to standard setters and market regulators to evaluate 
the relevance and reliability of accounting policy and regulatory guidelines made by 
them. At last, the empirical evidence provided in this study serves as useful reference 
for financial statement users, such as investors, information and financial 
intermediaries. 
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Based on the empirical evidence from 798 A-share firms in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 1998, I found two major factors driving the early 
adoption"^ decision of this "four valuation allowances" policy. First, consistent with 
“big bath" phenomenon in prior western literature, firms with loss and failing to meet 
10% return of equity (ROE) requirement for rights offering by Chinese Security 
Regulatory Committee (CSRC) are more likely to adopt the income-decreasing 
accounting policy voluntarily in 1998. Second, management change is another strong 
motivation for the early adoption. 
Based on 727 firm-year observations, I find the value-relevance of accounting 
information of allowances for accounts receivable, inventory, short-term investment 
and long-term investment in balance sheet and corresponding expenses and losses 
items，in income statement. Furthermore, by separating out the information provided 
under the new accounting method over the old rule, the evidence indicates that the 
additional information contained in the new allowance and expenses are significantly 
associated with the price and return with the predicted sign. The findings suggest that 
new accounting method provides incremental information over the old accounting 
policy. 
The rest of this paper consists of the following sections: Section 2 introduces 
the institutional background. Section 3 reviews the related literature. Section 4 
presents the hypotheses development and research design. Section 5 describes the 
sample selection. Section 6 reports empirical analysis results and section 7 concludes 
the study. 
4 Early adopters are firms which adopted this "Four Valuation Allowances" policy in year 1998. 
Accordingly, firms adopted this accounting change in 1999 are defined as late adopters. Once firms 
adopted this accounting change, they announced their adoption in the footnote of annual reports. 
5 The four expenses and losses are, namely, bad debt expense, loss on market deduction of inventory, 
loss on market deduction of short-term investment and loss on market deduction of long-term 
investment. 
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2 Institutional Background 
2.1 Chinese Capital Market and Its Accounting and Reporting Framework 
For the past two decades, China has experienced a great economic change 
highlighted with its State Owned Enterprises (SOE) reform from highly rigid state-
planned production units to independent business enterprises. To facilitate the SOE 
reform and alleviate the capital shortage of SOEs, the PRC government reactivated 
the stock markets in early 1990s. Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE) were established in 1990 and 1991, respectively. A-shares are 
traded among domestic investors while B-shares and H-shares are available only to 
foreign investors and Hong Kong investors^see Table 2). 
As the China's capital markets have flourished, Chinese accounting 
professions and government have promulgated a number of new regulations. In early 
1990，s, MOF commenced the process of developing a new set of accounting 
standards to meet the increasing demand for information of capital market 
participants, and also to bring China's accounting standards closer to IAS. Under the 
current reporting system, listed firms are mandated to disclose information items such 
as prospectus, listing announcements, annual and interim financial statements, and 
temporary announcements of major events such as merger and acquisition. As a 
matter of fact, the annual report has become "the most significant and reliable source 
of information on listed Chinese firms for domestic investors, with both annual 
operation results and some significant events disclosed for the first time,"^ (Haw, Qi， 
6 Listed Chinese firms usually do not make preliminaiy earnings announcements. Their annual 
operation results are first released to the public through the publication of the abstracts of their annual 
reports on the newspapers designated by the CSRC. 
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& Wu, 1999). Most of Chinese listed firms only fulfill the minimum disclosure 
requirement of CSRC and seldom provide earnings forecasts or voluntary 
information. As a result, little firm-specific information is available besides the annual 
reports for investors to make accurate forecasts for future earnings. Moreover， 
financial analysts and financial press in China are, in the current stage, still at their 
infancy and can not act effectively as the information intermediaries between listed 
firms and investors. 
2.2 CSRC Regulations on Listed Firms 
CSRC was set up in July 1992 to monitor and regulate the stock markets and 
its policies have profound impact on listed firms with regard to information 
disclosure，stock issues and tradings. The current disclosure system is mainly based 
on 1) ''Provisional Regulation on Administration of Security Issuance and Trading" 
(the State Council, 1993), 2) "Detailed Rules for Information Disclosure for Listed 
Chinese Companies” (CSRC, 1993), 3) “Standards for the Content and Format of 
Information Disclosure of Listed Chinese Companies，，(CSRC, 1997), and 4) Security 
Law (the People's Congress，1999). There are, moreover, 30 detailed accounting 
standards which essentially "bring China's accounting practice into further 
conformity with IAS,” (Xiang, 1998). 
Rights offering is the main source for listed companies to raise additional 
capital after IPO because "it is almost impossible for listed companies to issue bonds 
under the present regulatory environment," (Haw, Qi, & Wu, 1998a). CSRC restricts 
the eligibility of rights offering only to firms which are profitable for the most recent 
three years, with average ROE greater than 10% and none of ROE is lower than 6% in 
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each year (CSRC, 1998). To be qualified for using stock rights as a way of raising 
capital, listed Chinese firms are strongly motivated to meet the ROE requirements. 
In China, listed firms are also strongly motivated to avoid losses in 
consecutive years. According to CSRC regulations on suspension and delisting, a 
company's listing stock may be suspended and terminated if the company has 
incurred losses for three consecutive years (Article 157 & 158，Chinese Company 
Law, 1993). Since 1998, the listed firms get a "Special Treatment (ST)，，mark on their 
stock if they had losses for two consecutive years and a "Partial Trade (PT)，，mark for 
a further loss after getting the ST mark. If companies get the “ST，，or “PT，，mark，the 
trading of their stocks are under some restriction. In early 2000, CSRC canceled the 
5% price-falling boundary for PT stocks, which make the prices of PT stocks possibly 
below their par value. 
2,3 Evolution of “Four Valuation Allowances，，Policy 
One of the most significant differences between Chinese GAAP and IAS has 
been how to account for allowances for short-term and long-term investments, 
account receivables, and inventories. Valuation allowances were not required for 
short-term and long-term investments and inventories before 1998, and the allowance 
for doubtful accounts was limited to the range of 0.3-0.5% of the total accounts 
receivable. These restrictions make accounting book values far from their economic 
values and hence limit the usefulness of accounting information. To minimize this 
shortcoming, MOF requires Chinese firms listed in overseas and those issued H-
shares and B-shares to select methods and percentages of allowances for the four 
specified assets in their 1998 annual reports. However, A-share companies are not 
required to follow this policy voluntarily in 1998 (MOF, NO. 7, 1998). Thus, most of 
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the A-share firms remained to use the old accounting system with no or insufficient 
valuation allowances in 1998. MOF, therefore, promulgated Supplementary Provision 
of Accounting System for Shareholding Companies: Accounts and Financial 
Statements {MOF, No. 35 & No. 49, 1999) in 1999 to mitigate the policy inconsistency 
among listed firms by mandating all shareholding companies to follow this "Four 
Valuation Allowances" policy from 1999. Since this accounting policy has 
dramatically negative impact on listed firm's financial statement，the rule allows 
companies to use a retroactive method to record the cumulative effects of these 
valuation allowance adjustments in order to minimize firms' implementation cost. 
Specifically, the cumulative effect on prior years is recognized as a reduction of 
beginning balance of retained earnings at the adoption year rather than recorded as an 
extraordinary loss in the income statement of current year. Subsequently, CRSC 
promulgated the Notice Related to Preparation for Valuation-reduction Allowances 
for Listed Firms to re-emphasize this policy. As a result，all listed firms report their 
financial statements under the new accounting policy in 1999 and most of the firms 
make retroactive adjustment of prior years' earnings. The current PRC GAAP on 
accounting method of the four assets is listed in Appendix 2. 
2.3 Effects of “Four Valuation Allowances，，Policy Change on Financial 
Reporting and Tax 
The accounting policy change dramatically affects the Chinese listed firms' 
financial reports. The financial statements of prior years are restated as the retroactive 
method is used to record the accounting change effects of prior years. Both assets and 
earnings are reduced in the adoption year for the current and retroactive adjustments. 
The "Four Valuation Allowance" policy is to make the book value of assets better 
8 
reflect the real value of the assets by requiring firms to record the valuation 
allowances according to market or based on discretionary estimation. Revenues and 
expenses are better matched so as to reduce the problem of inflated earnings. 
The accounting policy change allows firms to use retroactive method to trace 
back the cumulative effect to prior years accordingly, so that both the balance sheet 
and income statement of prior years are adjusted. Net income in the adoption year is 
reduced by additional allowances made under the new rule. 
The "Four Valuation Allowances" accounting change does not affect tax 
because of the application of different rules for tax and accounting reporting under 
Chinese tax law. Current Chinese tax law only allows the 0.3-0.5% of accounts 
receivables as deduction of taxable income, and any other allowances can not be 
included as income deduction to reduce the tax. So tax saving would not be a motive 
for voluntarily early adoption. 
3. Literature Review 
3.1 Accounting Choice Study 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986 &1990) advocate the positive accounting study by 
providing hypotheses to address managerial accounting choice issues. The main 
hypotheses are: (1) the bonus plan hypothesis: managers of firms with bonus plans are 
more likely to choose accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from future 
periods to the current period; (2) the debt covenant hypothesis: the closer a firm is to 
violation of accounting-based debt covenants, the more likely the firm manager is to 
select accounting procedures that shift reported earnings from future periods to the 
current period; (3) the political cost hypothesis: the greater the political costs faced by 
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a firm, the more likely the manager is to choose accounting that defer reported 
earnings from current to future periods. Much positive accounting theory research has 
been devoted to testing the implications of those three hypotheses. 
Prior positive studies show that many factors affect the timing of management 
accounting choices, such as political costs, management compensation, and debt 
covenants (Watts & Zimmerman，1978). Langer and Lev (1993) specify factors 
affecting the timing of adoption. One group of factors is related to the compliance 
cost, including recontracting cost and direct cost of adoption. Another group of factors 
is related to investor perception. Economic consequences theories of accounting 
choice predict that the firm's accounting policy decisions are related to its explicit and 
implicit contracting environment. Trombley (1989) finds that firm size and auditor 
effects are strongly associated with early adoption of SFAS No.86 by including 
employment relations, debt agreements and insider ownership as control variables. 
McNichols and Wilson (1988) provides evidence for that income-decreasing 
accruals are chosen when income is unusually high or low, by modeling how 
provision of bad debt would be presented without earnings management. Healy 
(1985) investigates the bonus plan and finds the “big bath" phenomenon. If net 
income is below the lower bound of bonus plan, the manager has incentive to lower it 
further, in other words，taking a bath. Balsam et.al (1995) examines managers' timing 
choice to determine why managers choose a particular year in adoption mandated 
changes. Their study finds that "early adopters select the year of adoption when their 
change in ROA is lowest and their change in leverage is highest". This finding is 
consistent with income management, managerial efficiency and opportunistic 
behavior. Haw, Jung and Lilien (1991) examines financial characteristics, such as 
earnings, debt covenants，management compensation, firm risk and financial structure 
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for firms which settle their overfunded defined benefit pension plans. Their results 
suggest that firms undertake settlement to offset a decline in earnings. Bartov (1993) 
examines the timing of income recognition from disposal of long-lived assets and 
investments and finds that managers choose the timing of assets sales to smooth 
interim earnings changes and to mitigate accounting-based restrictions in bond 
covenants. 
Strong and Meyer (1987) shows the most significant difference between the 
writedown and non-writedown groups is a change in senior management based on the 
cases of assets writedown in the U.S. during 1981 to 1985. Francis，Hanna and 
Vincent (1996) argues that a recent change in management may be associated with 
write-offs because new management has incentives to “clear the deck，，to improve 
investors' perceptions of the future financial performances of the firm. Luo (2000) 
suggests that management change may be a factor of various accounting method 
changes of A-share firms listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
3.2 Value-relevance Study of Financial Reporting 
In recent years, many researchers have examined the usefulness of fair value 
accounting to investors. Fair value accounting is a longstanding major agenda item of 
the FASB and also a tendency of PRC GAAP in a further conformity with IAS. This 
section will summarize the subsets of value relevance research related to fair value 
accounting. 
One group of value relevance studies focuses on fair values relates to pension 
and other post retirement obligations (OPEB). Their findings indicate that pension 
assets and liabilities and OPEB liabilities are perceived by investors as assets and 
liabilities of the firm but with smaller pricing multiples (Landsman, 1986; Amir, 
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1993). Barth (1991) finds that the fair value of pension assets measures the pension 
asset implicit in share prices more reliably than the book values of pension assets 
calculated under SFAS No. 87. 
Another group of value relevance studies addresses questions relating to fair 
value of debt and equity securities, particularly those held by banks and insurance 
companies (e.g. Barth, 1994; Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 1996; Barth and Clinch, 
1998). These studies consistently find that investors perceive fair value estimates for 
these securities as more value relevant than historical cost amounts. Barth (1994) 
finds that fair value estimation error is exacerbated for securities gains and losses 
which are based on changes in fair value. Estimation error in securities gains and 
losses can be substantial enough to eliminate its value relevance. 
Another group of value relevance studies addresses questions relating to fair 
value estimates of bank loans. Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1996) finds that 
investors perceive fair value of bank loans with more relevance and reliability than 
historical cost amounts. Beaver and Venkatachalam (2000) finds that pricing 
multiples on the discretionary component of loan fair values are higher than those on 
the non-discretionary component. 
Another group of value relevance studies examines questions relating to fair 
value of nonfmancial intangible assets. Aboody and Lev (1998) finds that costs of 
intangible asset values are implicit in share prices with some reliability. Lev and 
Souginnis (1996) finds that R&D and advertising expenditures are perceived by 
investors as capital acquisitions. Other studies address the question relating to fair 
value estimates of tangible long-lived assets focus on assets revaluation under the U. 
K or Australian GAAP. Barth and Clinch (1998) finds that revalued asset amounts are 
relevant and estimated with at least some reliability. 
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While there are many variations in their research design, they typically use 
equity market values as the valuation benchmark to assess how well particular 
accounting amounts reflect information used by investors. The tests often focus on the 
coefficients on the accounting amounts in estimation equation. One group of studies 
tests whether the coefficient on interested accounting amount is significantly different 
from zero with the predicted sign (e.g. Barth, 1994; Barth, Beaver，and Landsman, 
1996). Other studies test whether the coefficient on noted accounting amount 
significantly differs from those on other amounts recognized in financial statements 
(e.g. Barth, Clement, Foster, and Kasznik, 1998). Another group of studies examines 
whether the coefficient on an accounting amount is different from its theoretical 
coefficient based on a valuation model (e.g. Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 1992). 
Prior studies use kinds of valuation models in the empirical analysis. One is 
balance sheet model (price model) with the association between market value of 
equity and book value of equity (e.g. Barth, 1994); the other is capitalized earnings 
model (return model) linking stock return with accounting income (e.g. Barth, 1994). 
Different models serve for different research interests. Price model and long-window 
return model determine what is reflected in firm value and the short-window return 
model examines whether the accounting amount is timely reflected in share price. 
In China, some prior studies also address the value-relevance of summary 
accounting information, e.g. annual, interim earnings, and cash flows, both in 
domestic A-share and overseas B-and H-share markets. Haw, Qi and Wu (1999， 
1998b) find earnings under PRC GAAP is value-relevant in A-share market and more 
significantly associate with returns and market-to-book value than earnings under IAS 
or Hong Kong GAAP in B/H-share markets. Ma (2000) finds the interim earnings 
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information is value-relevant to Chinese investors. Li (2001) finds that mandated cash 
flow information has incremental information content on earnings. 
4 Hypotheses Development and Research Design 
The following hypotheses and research models are developed to investigate 
the two research questions: 1) why did some firms voluntarily adopt the "Four 
Valuation Allowances" policy earlier than the mandated adoption year? and 2) 
Whether the information provided under the "Four Valuation Allowances" rule is 
value-relevant? 
4.1 Determinants of Early Adoption Choice 
B- and H-share companies are required to comply with the "Four Valuation 
Allowances" policy in the year beginning at January 1，1998, while A-share firms are 
allowed to adopt this new policy early in 1998 but mandated to comply with it in 
1999. Since the adoption of the "Four Valuation Allowances" policy will decrease 
earnings and assets rather than increase them, it is worth investigating why firms 
adopted this accounting change earlier than the mandatory adoption date. 
Rights offering becomes the major financing source for listed Chinese firms 
after their IPO, thus, the firms are strongly motivated to meet the ROE requirement of 
the CSRC to be qualified for rights offering and to avoid being suspended as ST and 
PT firms. It 's worth investigating how firms with different "status" on rights offering 
or share suspension react to this income-decreasing accounting policy change when it 
is not mandatory. I classify listed Chinese firms into three sub-groups based on their 
return on equity before the accounting change: (1) loss firms whose ROE are below 0; 
(2) non-qualifiers for rights offering whose ROE are higher than 0 but lower than 
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10%, who are not eligible to offer rights; (3) qualifiers for rights offering whose ROE 
are higher than 10%, who can offer rights. When firms fail to reach one of the two 
ROE levels (1) positive ROE to avoid to be marked as ST or PT; (2) 10% ROE to 
offer rights, I predict that they are more likely to further reduce their reported earnings 
by voluntarily adopting this accounting policy change to increase their chance to 
reach the ROE level in the next year. Following two null hypothesis are formed: 
Hypothesis 1.1: Loss firms are less likely to adopt this accounting method change 
earlier in 1998. 
Hypothesis L2: Non-qualifier firms are less likely to adopt this accounting method 
change earlier in 1998, 
Prior studies e.g. Strong and Meyer (1987), Francis, Hanna and Vincent 
(1996), argue that a change in management is associate with assets write-down and 
write-offs. Luo (2000) also suggests that management change may be a factor of 
various accounting method changes of A-share firms listed in Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that management change 
is associated with restructurings. In the case of this study, a new manager is more 
likely to adopt this significantly income-decreasing accounting method change in 
his/her early years in the position, given he/she has the knowledge that this "Four 
Valuation Allowances" accounting method change will become mandatory sooner or 
later. The following hypothesis (in null) is formed: 
Hypothesis 1.3: Firms with management change are less likely to adopt the 
accounting method change earlier in 1998. 
To test whether management change is associated with early adoption 
decision, I include the management change variable in 1998 in the logistic model. 
Management change is defined as any change in the position of (deputy) chairman of 
the board and chief manager in the listed firm. 
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Watts and Zimmerman (1986) formulates three major hypotheses，namely, 
bonus plan hypothesis, debt covenant hypothesis, political cost hypothesis, to predict 
managerial actions as the choices of accounting policies and new accounting 
standards. In the setting of Chinese capital market, however, to what extent these 
factors can explain managerial accounting choices remains unknown. Since the 
compensation scheme is not popular for Chinese managers, the bonus plan hypothesis 
is not tested in this study. I include debt equity ratio to test the debt covenant 
hypothesis (in null). 
Hypothesis 1.4: Firms with higher debt equity ratio are more likely to adopt this 
accounting method change earlier in 1998. 
However, political cost hypothesis may not explain the correlation between 
firm size and accounting choice action，because political costs per se may not exist 
and haven't been observed under the current environment in China. Instead, I include 
size to control for omitted variables in the logistic model. 
Balsam, Haw and Lilien (1995) finds that firms strategically choose the timing 
of changing their accounting methods to manipulate their reported earnings. Change 
of return on equity is utilized in this study to test whether the change of earnings 
performance affects the managerial accounting choice. Moreover, the time-series 
trend o f R O A and ROE are investigated for both early adopters and late adopters over 
five years. 
A logistic model is used to test which factors motivated the “early adoption" 
decision of the sample firms. I separately analyze the sample with single listing firms 
and with multiple listing firm. The dependent variable and independent variables are 
specified as following: 
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ADOPT 98 =议0 + oc.LOSS 卯 + a^NQUA ,, + a.MGC 卯 + ,, + a.DER + a,SIZE + s 
Equation (1.1) 
where, 
ADOPTgs 二 1 if the company adopted the accounting policy change in 1998 and 0 
otherwise; 
LOSS98 二 dummy variable, 1 for loss firms in 1998 and 0 otherwise ； 
NQUA98 二 dummy variable, 1 for nonqualifiers^ for rights offering in 1998 and 0 for 
qualifiers for rights offering; 
MGC98 = dummy variable, 1 if there is management change in 1998 and 0 otherwise; 
AROE98 = change of return on equity in 1998, net income divided by equity; 
DER = debt equity ratio in 1998; 
SIZE = log value of total assets in 1998; 
s = random error item. " 
Significant positive coefficients on the variables indicate the association 
between the factors and the early adopting action. Under Chinese regulatory setting, 
significant positive signs on LOSS98 and NQUAgs are expected. Moreover, MGCgs are 
expected to be significantly positive. 
4.2 Value-relevance of the “Four Valuation Allowance，，Policy 
The second part of this paper aims to provide empirical evidence on value-
relevance of the information required under the new accounting policy. Two specific 
questions are examined: (1) Whether the accounting information provided under the 
new accounting policy is value relevant? (2) Whether the information provided under 
7 Non-qualifiers are firms whose ROE before the accounting change is lower than 10%. 
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the new rule is incrementally value-relevant over the information provided under the 
old rule? 
Hypothesis 2.1: The allowances and corresponding expenses information provided 
under the new accounting policy are not value relevant. 
The first question is to test how asset allowances result in alignment between 
information reflected in annual reports and information implicit in stock prices and 
returns. In another words, it is to test whether the asset allowances reflect the firm 
value and its changes, which are also perceived by the market and incorporated into 
stock price. Both price model and return model are employed to test first hypothesis 
in this value-relevance study. 
To test hypothesis 2.1, I decompose the book value of equity into book value 
before the four specified assets (BVBt), the gross book value of the four specified 
assets (BVFSA^ and the four allowances under the new rule (ALLNi). As shown in the 
following price model, significant as indicates the value-relevance of allowances 
information provided under the new rule. Its sign is predicted to be negative. 
MVE" = a�+a,BVB, +a^BVFSA, +a^ALLN, +s Equation (2.1) 
where, 
MVEt = market value of equity at the end of the fourth month in year t+1 ；^ 
BVBt = book value of equity before net book value of the four specified assets in year 
t； 
BVFSAt = reported gross book value of the four specified assets in year t; 
ALLNt = reported allowances for the four specified assets in year t. 
8 Year t represents the year when the firm adopted the "Four valuation allowances" policy: t= 1998 for 
early adopters and t=1999 for late adopters. 
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By adopting this new accounting policy, firms increase not only allowances but 
also current period expenses. A return model is employed to test the value-relevance 
of such expenses items. Significant P2 indicates the value relevance of expenses 
generated under the new accounting rule. Negative sign on P2 is predicted. 
RET] = A) + + P^EXPN, + s Equation (2.2) 
where, 
RETt = market adjusted annual rate of return at year t，from the beginning of May in 
year t to the end of April in year t+1; 
CEBt = change of earnings before the four specified expenses and losses in year t; 
EXPNt 二 four expenses and losses reported in year t. 
To answer the question of whether the information provided under the new rule 
is incrementally value-relevant over the information provided under the old rule, it's 
necessary to identify the "new information" provided under the newly issued 
accounting policy over the previous one. 
Hypothesis 2,2: The difference between the allowances and expenses under the new 
rule and those under the old rule are not value-relevant 
DIFA is defined as the difference between the reported allowances under the 
new rule and estimated allowances under the old rule assuming there is no accounting 
policy change9. DIFA is current effect of this accounting policy change. The 
following price model (2.3) is developed and significant as indicates the incremental 
91 use ratio of bad debt allowance in the percentage of accounts receivable, the ratio under the old rule, 
in year t-1 to calculate the estimated bad debt allowance in adoption year t firm specifically. Under the 
old rule, no valuation allowances for other three assets are allowed. So the estimated amounts for other 
three valuation allowances are zero. 
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value-relevance of allowances provided under the new rule over the old rule. Its sign 
is predicted to be negative. 
MKE,, 二 a �+ a,BVB, + a^BVFSAO, + a,DIFA^ + e Equation (2.3) 
where, 
MVEt = market value of equity at the end of the fourth month in year t+1; 
BVBt = book value of equity before net book value of the four specified assets in year 
t； 
BVFSAOt = net book value of the four specified assets under the old rule, assuming no 
accounting change in year t; 
DIFAt = difference between the allowances for the four specified assets under the new 
rule and those under the old rule in year t. 
DIFB is defined as the difference between the reported expenses under the new 
rule and the estimated expenses under the old rule assuming no accounting policy 
change. Following return model (2.4) is developed to test the hypothesis 2.2. 
Significant P2 indicates the incremental value relevance of expenses under the new 
rule over the old rule. Negative sign on P2 is predicted. 
RET] : P�— p,CEBO, + pj:>IFBt + s Equation (2.4) 
where, 
RETt = market adjusted annual rate of return in year t, from the beginning of May in 
year t to the end of April in year t+1; 
CEBOt = change of earnings before the four specified expenses and losses under the 
old rule, assuming no accounting change in year t; 
DIFBt = difference between estimated amount^^ of four specified expenses under the 
10 Since bad debt expense is not separately disclosed under the PRC GAAP, I use the difference of 
beginning balance and ending balance of bad debt allowance as the proxy for bad debt expense. 
Estimated bad debt expense are calculated based on the bad debt allowance ratio under the old rule 
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old rule assuming no accounting method change and reported expenses under 
the new rule; 
Since retroactive adjustment is allowed to record the effect of the change on 
prior years, firms disclose the retroactive effect in the footnote of financial statements. 
Retroactive adjustment is made as a deduction of beginning balance of retained 
earnings in the adoption year. In spite of the disclosure format, the retroactive effect is 
new information. The null hypothesis tests whether this information in the footnote is 
incrementally value-relevant, after controlling the current effect of the accounting 
change. 
Hypothesis 2.3: Controlling for the current effect, the retroactive adjustment effect 
is not value relevant 
The following price model (2.5) is employed and significant a � indicates the 
value-relevance of the retroactive adjustment effect. Its sign is predicted to be 
negative. 
MVE., = a �+ a^BVBB, + a^BVRA, + a^BVFSAO,^ + a,DIFA + s Equation (2.5) 
where, 
MVEt = market value of equity at the end of the fourth month in year t+1; 
BVBBt =book value of equity before both current and retroactive effects, measured as 
book value of equity before retroactive adjustment after excluding net book 
value of the four specified assets in year t; 
BVRAt = retroactive adjustment for beginning book value of equity at year t; 
BVFSAOt = net book value of the four specified assets under the old rule, assuming no 
accounting change in year t; 
DIFAt 二 difference between the allowances for the four specified assets under the new 
rule and those under the old rule in year t. 
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Return model (2.6) is developed to test the hypothesis 2.3. Significant p3 
indicates the value relevance of retroactive adjustment effect caused by the 
accounting change. Negative sign on P3 is predicted. 
RET] 二 /?�+ fiiCEBOt + P禪Bt + P.BVRA, + s Equation (2.6) 
where, 
RET] = market adjusted annual rate of return at year t, from the beginning May of year 
t to the end of April in year t+1; 
CEBOt = change of earnings before four specified expenses and losses under the old 
rule, assuming no accounting change in year t; 
DIFBt = difference between estimated amount of four specified expenses under the 
old rule assuming no accounting change and reported amount under the new 
rule; 
BVRAt 二 retroactive adjustment of the beginning book value of equity in year t. 
All the price models are deflated by total shares and thus each variable in price 
model is on per-share basis. White procedure is performed to mitigate possible 
existing heteroscedasticity problem. All the independent variables in the return 
models are deflated by market value of equity at the end of the April in year t. I 
estimate all the regression models (2.1) to (2.6) for the full sample, early adopting 
firms versus late adopting firms, and single listing firms versus multiple listing firms, 
respectively. I also additional test the disaggregated allowances and expenses items to 
further study the attributes of each assets allowance. 
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5 Sample Selection and Data 
As shown in Panel A Table 3，the sample selection starts with the population 
of all the A-share firms listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock exchanges in year 
1998, the first year of the voluntary accounting change. Since some Chinese 
companies are not bound to the CSRC rule by making more than 0.5% bad debt 
allowance and make allowances for market deduction of inventory before the "Four 
Valuation Allowances" policy promulgated in 1998. Therefore, I exclude 27 
companies with more than 0.5% bad debt allowance ratio before 1998 and companies 
with allowances for market deduction of inventory before 1998 from the total sample. 
So the final sample in the accounting choice study consists of 798 firms in year 1998. 
By dropping firms with missing price data and annual return data, the sample for the 
value relevance study is reduced to 726 firms for the price model and 717 firms for 
return model in their adoption year. All financial data are collected from China Stock 
market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and stock price and return data 
are collected from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) Database. The management 
change and retroactive adjustment data under the "Four Valuation Allowances" policy 
change are hand collected from annual financial reports released in Shenzhen 
Securities Times and Shanghai Securities Daily. 
Panel B Table 3 describes the sample distribution by adoption year and by 
listing status. Firms which voluntarily adopted the “Four Valuation Allowance" 
policy are defined as “early adopters,” while firms which adopted this policy in 1999 
are defined as “late adopters." Firms which issue A-share only are called single listing 
firms while A-share firms which also issue B-share or H-share are called multiple 
listing firms. For the price models, there are 103 (623) early (late) adopters and 668 
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(58) single (multiple) listing firms. For the return models, there are 84 (633) early 
(late) adopters and 664 (53) single (multiple) listing firms. 
6 Empirical analysis 
6.1 Determinants of Early adoption Choice 
Table 4 contains summary statistics for the accounting choice study. Panel A 
reports mean and median values of selected key financial items and ratios by early 
and late adopters. The last column reports significance levels for t-test and 
nonparametric (wilcoxon) test of whether the mean and median values differ between 
the two groups. Three is no significant difference of market value of equity (p=0.33) 
and debt-equity ratio (p=0.21) between the early and late adopters. Early adopting 
firms have significantly lower profit generating ability than late adopters both in mean 
and median of net income, return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA) (all at 0.01 
sigi::巧广ant level). Early adopters also have significantly higher amount of the four 
specified assets than late adopters. Both the absolute value of the four specified assets 
and its percentage of total assets are higher for early adopters at the 1% level. The 
early adopters have significantly higher ratios in both the aggregate and disaggregate 
ratios for allowances in each specified asset than the late adopters. 
Panel B presents the mean and median values of selected variable for late 
adopters by 1998 (before accounting change) and 1999 (after accounting change). The 
absolute values of allowances and their percentages of corresponding assets are 
signiticiitly different before and after the accounting method change (all at 0.01 
significance level). The ROE and ROA between 1998 and 1999 are also significantly 
different, which indicates the earnings-decreasing effect of this policy change. 
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Panel C reports the time-series statistics o伙OE and ROA for the early and late 
adopters from 1996 to 2000. For the early adopters, the median value of both ROE 
and ROA generally fall to the lowest level in the adoption year of 1998 during the 5-
year surrounding time period. On the contrary, no similar pattern is observed for the 
late adopters，whose ROE and ROA are in a continuous downward trend, which 
reflects the macro-economy in China. 
Table 5 reports the univariate statistics of variables included in the logistic 
model for the accounting choice study. There are 735 (741) firms in sample A 
(sample B) group, whose early adopter group {ADOPT = 1) only consists of single 
listing (multiple listing) firms. Sample C contains 798 firms and its early adopter 
group contains both single and multiple listing firms. Panel A reports the number of 
the observations which equal to 1 and 0 for each of the dummy variables included in 
logistic model (1.1). There are 57 (678)，47(694) and 104(694) early (late) adopter 
firms in sample A, B and C, respectively. Panel B describes the mean and median 
values of each continuous variable included in the model (1.1). The median ofAROE 
is -0.02 for all sample groups. Median values of DER are 0.76, 0.76, and 0.77 for 
sample group A, B and C. Median values of SIZE are 20.42，20.48，and 20.47 for 
these three sample groups. 
Table 6 reports the regression results of the logistic model for the accounting 
choice study. For the sample A group, the coefficients on LOSSgs and MGCgs are 
positively significant; while for sample B and C, coefficients on NQUAgs and SIZE 
variables are also positively significant besides those on LOSSgs and MGCgs- The 
coefficients on I\ROE and DER are not significant for all three samples. The 
regression results indicate that loss firms are more likely to adopt the income-
decreasing accounting policy change, which is consistent with the “big bath" 
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phenomena found in earlier literature (e.g. Healy, 1985; McNichols and Wilson, 
1988). Management change is another strong motive for the early adoption, (e.g. 
Strong and Meyer, 1987; Francis，Hanna, and Vincent; 1996). For the sample B and 
C groups, the results show that non-qualifiers for rights offering are inclined to 
adopter the accounting change earlier. Since they cannot meet the ROE requirement 
of CSRC in 1998, non-qualifier firms may further reduce net income thus prepare for 
better earnings performance for the next year. Size variable, which may proxies for 
the omitted variables in regression and is measured as log value of total assets, is 
positively significant only in sample the B and For a sensitivity test, I include an 
additional dummy variable, ML, representing for the multiple listing firms in the 
logistic regression for the sample C. The result shows that ML is positively 
significant, while SIZE becomes insignificant. Multiple listing firms are larger than 
single listing firms in size (t test of both size variables between single and multiple 
listing firms are significant at the 1% level). It 's appears that multiple listing firms are 
inclined to adopt this accounting policy change early in 1998，which is consistent with 
the predictable results of the regulatory guideline promulgated inl998. 
6.2 Value-relevance of the “Four Valuation Allowance'' Policy 
Table 7 describes the univariate and correlation analysis of variables used in 
price models for value-relevance study. Panel A presents the univariate statistics of 
each regression variables. The mean (median) oiMVE is 16.48 (14.07)，which reflect 
the average market price per share for Chinese stocks. Besides MVE, all other 
variables are measured at their book value. The mean and median of BVBB (BVB) are 
u Similar results are generated when I use log value of market value of equity as an alternative 
measurement in sensitivity test. 
26 
0.57 (0.43) and 0.70 (0.59), respectively. The mean and median values of BVFSA 
(BVFSAO) are 2.53 (2.52) and 2.19 (2.19). The mean (median) of BVRA is 0.13 (0.07) 
and the mean (median) of DIFA is 0.14 (0.07), respectively. Panel B presents the 
Pearson correlation coefficients and probabilities between each pair of independent 
variables. The coefficient on correlation between BVFSA and BVBB (BVB) are -0.71 
(-0.73) at the 1% significance level. The coefficient on correlation between BVRA and 
DIFA is 0.68 (p二0.001). 
Table 8 reports the regression results for price model (2.1), (2.3) and (2.5). 
Panel A shows the regression results for the value relevance of allowances under the 
new rule. Consistent with prior studies, the coefficients on oci and a i are positively 
significant, which indicates that book value of equity before the four specified assets 
and gross value of the four specified assets are value-relevant to investors, as is 
negatively significant for the full sample at the 5% significance level (t=-2.06), which 
indicates the value-relevance of the allowances made under the new policy. The sub-
sample analysis reports similar results for the late adopter group (n=623) and single 
listing group (n=668). However, the coefficients on ALLN are insignificant for the 
early adopter group (n=103) and for the multiple listing group (n=58). In early adopter 
group, there are 32 loss firms whose accounting information is more likely to have 
less information content compared with firms with no financial troubles. Small 
sample size might be another explanation for the insignificance of the interested 
variable for these two groups. As shown in Panel B, the coefficients on the current 
effect, DIFA, are negatively significant (t=-2.03 for the full sample), indicating the 
value relevance of current effect of this accounting change. The coefficients on BVB 
and BVFSAO are positively significant, indicating the value-relevance of equity 
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before the four specified assets and the four specified assets reported under the old 
rule. The results of sub-sample analysis are similar with the results in Panel A. For the 
late adopters and the single listing firms, regression results are consistent with the full 
sample. However, DIFA is insignificant for the early adopters and the multiple listing 
firms. Panel C shows the regression results for model (2.5). By including BVRA， 
retroactive effect, the results become mixed. The coefficients on BVBB，book value of 
equity before both current and retroactive effects, and BVFSAO are positively 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on BVRA is negatively significant for the 
full sample at the 1% level. However, the coefficient on DIFA becomes insignificant. 
Note the Pearson correlation between BVRA and DIFA is 0.68 (p二0.001)，which 
might indicate a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, stepwise regression analysis is 
conducted for the sensitivity. The results (not reported) indicate that both DIFA and 
BVRA are statistically significant with predicted negative sign, when they are 
alternatively included in the regression model one another. In summary, the price 
studies provide evidence suggesting the value-relevance of the allowances made 
under the new rule and the incremental information provided under the new rule over 
the old rule. Since all the regression variables are deflated by number of total shares, I 
use white procedure (White 1980) to check the sensitivity of heteroskedasticity. The 
results are qualitatively similar. 
Table 9 reports the univariate and correlation analysis of return models for the 
value-relevance study. Panel A reports the univariate statistics of each regression 
variable. The mean and median for annual market-adjusted return are 0.178 and — 
0.006, respectively. The mean and median of CEB, change of earnings before the four 
specified expenses and losses, are 0.0001 and 0.001, respectively. The mean and 
median of the aggregated four expenses and losses are 0.006 and 0.001. The Median 
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for CEBO and DIFB are 0.001, and the median of BVRA is 0.007. Panel B presents 
the Pearson correlation between each pair of independent variables and the 
significance level. The coefficient on the correlation between CEBO and DIFB is 
-0.48 (p=0.016) and the Pearson correlation coefficient between BVRA and CEBO 
(DIFB) is —0.80 (-0.69) at the 1% level. 
Table 10 reports the regression results for return models. Panel A shows the 
regression results for model (2.2), which tests the value-relevance of expenses and 
losses provided under the newly issued accounting policy. For the full sample, Pi is 
positively significant, which indicates value-relevance of earning changes before the 
four expenses and losses. P2 is significant for the full sample (t二-1.88), which 
indicates the value-relevance of the four expenses and losses reported under the new 
accounting policy. Significant coefficients on EXPN are found for the late adopter 
group (t=-3.45) and single listing group (t=-2.07). As shown in Panel B, significant 
coefficients on CEBO provides evidence on the value-relevance of earning changes 
before the four expenses and losses under the old rule. The coefficient on the current 
effect，DIFB, is negatively significant (t二-1.88) for the full sample, indicating the 
value relevance of the current effect of this accounting change. Consistent with the 
full sample, DIFB is negatively significant for the late adopter group (n=633) and the 
single listing firms (n=664). However, the coefficients on EXPN and DIFB for the 
early adopter group (n=84) and the multiple listing firms (n=53) are insignificant. The 
adjusted R^ of these two groups are relatively lower (R^=2.24% and -3.57%) 
compared with the adjusted R^ of the other two groups (R^=10.68% and 8.70%). Panel 
C shows the regression results for return model (2.6). While significantly negative 
association between the current effect, DIFB, and annual return are observed for the 
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full sample, the early adopter groups and the single listing firms, no significant 
association between BVRA and annual return are observed. Overall, the return study 
provides evidence for the value-relevance of the current effect of the four expenses 
and losses but not for the retroactive adjustment. Furthermore, the additional expenses 
and losses reported under the new rule over the old rule are also value relevant to 
investors. 
Table 11 presents the regression results for disaggregated analysis of each asset 
allowances for price models (2.1), (2.3) and (2.5). Consistent with empirical results in 
Table 8, the coefficients on BVB and BVFSA are similar. The coefficients on the 
allowance for market deduction of inventory is significant at 10% level with negative 
sign in model (2.1). The coefficient on difference of allowance for market deduction 
of inventory between the new and old rules is also significant in model (2.2). Similar 
with the results in Panel C Table 8, non-significance of each DIFA items are 
presented. 
Table 12 reports the regression results for disaggregated analysis of each 
expenses for return models (2.2), (2.4) and (2.6). Consistent with empirical results in 
Table 10, the coefficients on CEB and CEBO are positively significant. Coefficients 
on bad debt expense are negatively significant in all three models while the 
coefficients on loss on market deduction of inventory are positively significant in all 
three return models. The coefficient on correlation between EXPNi and EXPN2 are -
0.83 at the 1% significance level, which indicates a possible multicollinearity 
problem. Therefore, stepwise regression analysis is conducted for the sensitivity. The 
results (not reported) indicate that both EXPNi and EXPN2 are statistically significant 
with predicted negative sign, when they are alternatively included in the regression 
model one another. 
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7 Conclusion 
This study investigates accounting choice and value-relevance issues arising 
from a mandated accounting change in the emerging market of China. I specifically 
examine two research questions: 1) why did some firms voluntarily adopt this 
earnings and assets decreasing accounting change earlier in 1998 than mandated 
adoption year? and 2) Is the information provided under the "Four Valuation 
Allowances" rule value-relevant? 
Based on the 798 A-share Chinese firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges. I found two major factors driving the early adoption decision of 
listed Chinese firms. Consistent with “big bath" phenomenon in prior western 
literature, firms with losses and failing to meet 10% ROE requirements for rights 
offering by the CSRC are more likely to adopt the income-decreasing accounting 
policy voluntarily earlier in 1998. Management change is another motivation for the 
early adoption. However, there is no evidence supporting for political cost hypothesis 
and debt covenant hypothesis. The results also show that the early adopters 
implemented this earnings-decreasing accounting change in the year when their ROE 
and ROA are lowest. The early adopter firms have a lower profit generating ability 
and a higher ratio of specified assets to total assets compared with the late adopters. 
In the second part of this study, I find evidence supporting the value-relevance 
of allowance measures for accounts receivable, inventory, short-term investments and 
long-term investments in balance sheet and corresponding new expenses and losses 
items in income statement. Furthermore, the results suggest that the additional 
information provided under the new accounting method over the old rule is 
significantly associated with stock prices and returns with the predicted sign. Overall, 
the empirical evidence indicates that new accounting method provides incremental 
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information over the old accounting policy. However, I didn't find evidence 
supporting for the retroactive adjustments made by the accounting policy change is 
value-relevant. Disaggregated analysis implies that allowance for market deduction of 
inventory are most value-relevant among the four allowances and the bad debt 
expense and loss of market deduction of inventory are associated with annual returns. 
In summary, this study enriches the extant accounting literature in China by 
providing empirical evidence on the motivations for discretionary managerial 
accounting choices and the value-relevance of specific assets and expenses items 
other than summary measures. The empirical results in this study can also provide 
useful insight to Chinese standard setters and security market regulators about the 
relevance and reliability of this newly issued “four valuation allowances" accounting 
policy. In addition, this study sheds light on how managers of listed Chinese firms 
make discretionary accounting choices, and how investors value such information. 
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Table 1 Development of the Stock Market in China 
Panel A: Number and Market Value of Listed Companies: 
Number of listed firms (A-share and B-share) 
SHSE 8 29 105 171 188 293 383 438 490 
SZSE 5 23 76 120 135 237 362 413 459 
Total 13 52 181 291 323 530 745 851 949 
Market capitalization (in billion RMB) 
SHSE 2.9 71.5 218.8 259.7 252.6 547.8 921.8 1052.5 1458.1 
SZSE 8.0 49.0 133.5 109.1 94.9 436.5 831.1 877.4 1189.1 
Total 10.9 120.5 352.3 368.8 347.5 984.3 1752.9 1929.9 2647.2 
Panel B: Share Price Index of SHSE and SZSE: 
SHSE & SZSE Composite Index 1992-1999 
1600 -J   
1 4 0 0 -；  
1200 - y 
1000 l - ^ S H S E 
6 0 0 -  
4 0 0 -•  
200 — ^ ~  
0 -I f i f 1 f ^ ^  
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
SHSE: Shanghai Stock Exchange 
SZSE: Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Source: CSRC web page: http://www.csrc.gov.cn 
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Table 3 Sample Selection and Distribution 
Panel A: Sample Selection: 
Total A-share firms in 1998 825 
Companies with more than 0.005 bad debt allowance ratio in 1997^ and 
Companies with positive allowance for market deduction of inventory in 1 9 9 f (27) 
Total sample in Accounting Choice study 798 
Companies with missing market price data (72) 
Total sample in Price Study 726 
Companies with missing annual return data (81) 
Total sample in annual return study � 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Adoption Year and by Listing Status 
In Price Study: 
Total sample 726 
Early adopting firms 
Late adopting firms 623 
Single listing Firms (with only A-share) 668 
Multiple listing firms (with A- & B- or A- & H- shares) 58 
In Annual Return Study: 
Total sample 717 
Early adopting firms 抖 
Late adopting firms � 
Single listing Firms (with only A-share) 664 
Multiple listing firms (with A- & B- or A- & H- shares) 53 
a According to the PRC GAAP before "Four Valuation allowances" policy, the allowance for doubtful 
accounts was limited to the range of 0.3-0.5% of the total accounts receivable. However, some firms 
make Bad Debt Allowances with ratios higher than 0.5% in practice. Thus these firms are excluded from 
the sample in this study. 
b Under PRC GAAP before "Four Valuation Allowances" policy, no allowance for market deduction of 
inventoiy is required, and thus most of Chinese listed firms make no allowance for market deduction of 
inventory. However, a few firms voluntarily make this allowance and these firms are also excluded from 
the sample in this study. 
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Table 4 Summary Statistics for Accounting Choice Study 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics and Comparison for Early and Late Adopting Firms 
Early adopters Late adopters Significance level 
of difference ^ 
“ “ Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median^ 
Market value of equity (million) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Total assets (million) 2114 1064 1251 751 .02 .00 
Debt-equity ratio (%) 1.492 0.945 1.122 0.755 .21 .01 
Net income (million) -0.12 0.196 0.723 0.463 .00 .00 
Return on equity (%) -0-169 0.054 0.093 0.110 .00 .00 
Return on assets (%) -0-021 0.019 0.065 0.064 .00 .00 
BVof4 specified assets' (million) 827.6 536.8 509.2 326.4 .00 .00 
Aggregated 4 allowances' (million) 33.13 7.602 0.842 0.247 .00 .00 
4 assets / total assets (%) 0.496 0.490 0.449 0.458 .01 .01 
4 allowances / 4 assets (%) 0.04L 0.016 0.0016 0.0009 .00 .00 
Bad debt allowance/receivables (%) 0.031 0.004 0.002 0.002 .00 .00 
Allow, forinventory/inventory (%) 0.056 0.018 0.00 0.00 .00 .00 
Allowance for ST inv. / ST inv. (%) 0.104 0.000 0.00 0.00 .00 .00 
Allowance for LT inv. / LT inv. (%) 0.039 0.000 0.00 0.00 .00 .00 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics and Comparison for Early and Late Adopting Firms 
Before Change After Change Significance level 
1998 1999 of difference ^ 
“ Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median^ 
Market value of equity (million) ^ 丽 ^ ^ ^ 
Total assets (million) 1251 751 1339 905 .53 .01 
Debt-equity ratio (%) 1.122 0.755 1.136 0.733 .93 .33 
a I report significance levels for t test and nonparametric wilcoxon test of whether the mean and median 
value of the noted variable differs between the two sample groups, 
b Significance level of z-value of wilcoxon test is reported. 
c The four specified assets are accounts receivable, inventory, short-term investments and long-term 
investments. 
d The aggregated four allowances are total amount of the allowances made to the above four assets. 
a I report significance levels for t test and nonparametric wilcoxon test of whether the mean and median 
value of the noted variable differs between the two sample groups, 
b Significance level of z-value of wilcoxon test is reported. 
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Table 4 Summary Statistics for Accounting Choice Study (continued) 
Net income (million) ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Return on equity (%) 0.093 0.110 0.078 0.095 .41 .01 
Return on assets (%) 0.065 0.064 0.045 0.051 .00 .00 
BV of 4 specified assets (million) 509.2 326.4 570.5 376.1 .11 .00 
Aggregated 4 allowances (million) 0.842 0.247 30.1 14.61 .00 .00 
4 assets / total assets (%) 0.449 0.458 0.450 0.455 .94 .81 
4 allowances / 4 assets (%) 0.0016 0.0009 0.058 0.039 .00 .00 
Bad debt allowance/receivables (%) 0.002 0.002 0.080 0.059 .00 .00 
Allow, for inventory/ inventory (o/o) 0.00 0.00 0.046 0.014 .00 .00 
Allowance for ST inv. /STinv. (%) 0.00 0.00 0.040 0.000 .00 .00 
Allowance for LTinv. /LTinv. (%) 0.00 0.00 0.041 0.000 .00 .00 
Panel C: rime-series Statistics of ROE and ROA for Early and Late Adopting Firms 
~ 1 9 ^ i w ^ 
M e d i a n 0 . 0 5 4 
Early adopters ^腿 0.076 ‘ -0.124 -0.169 -0.063 -0.070 
r o e Median 0.136 0 ? m OJlO ^ ^ 
Late adopters 
Mean 0.148 0.126 0.093 0.078 0.058 
• M e d i a n 0 . 0 3 6 0.019 0.031 0.017 
Early adopters ^^^^ 讀 0.033 -0.021 -0.005 0.008 
R O A MedianOjO^ 0 0 ^ o W l 
Late adopters 
Mean 0.070 0.066 0.065 0.045 0.024 
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Table 5 Univariate Statistics for Variables Used in Accounting Choice Study 
Sample A^ Sample B Sample 
(N=735) (N=741) (N=798)  
Panel A: Frequency of the Sample for Dummy Variables (DV)^  
DV =1 DV=0 DV =1 DV=0 DV =1 DV=0 
ADOPT98 57 678 47 694 104 694 
LOSS.s 41 694 35 706 53 745 
NQUA.s 161 574 183 558 195 603 
MGQs 263 472 272 469 306 492 
Panel B: Mean and Median Values for Continuous Variables 衫 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
AROE -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 
DER 1.09 0.76 1.06 0.76 1.10 0.77 
SIZE 20.47 20.42 20.56 20.48 20.54 20.47 
ADOPT98 = 1 for early adopters (A-share firms which adopted "Four Valuation Allowance" 
accounting policy in 1998) and 0 otherwise 
LOSS98 = dummy variable，1 for loss firms in 1998 and 0 otherwise 
NQUA98 = dummy variable, 1 for nonqualifiers for rights offering in 1998 and 0 for qualifiers 
for rights offering 
MGC98 = dummy variable, 1 if there is management change in 1998 and 0 otherwise 
AROE= change of return on equity from 1997 to 1998 
DER= debt-equity ratio in 1998, total liability divided by equity 
SIZE = log of total assets in 1998 
a Early adopters only consist of firms which issue A-share in sample A group. 
b Early adopters consist of firms which issue both A-and B-shares or A- and H-shares in sample B group, 
c Early adopters include both firms with only A-share and firms with duel shares in sample C group, 
d In Panel A, the frequency of each dummy variable in sample A, B，and C are reported. In the column of 
"DV=1", the number of observations whose dummy variable equal to 1 are reported. In the column of 
"DV =0", the number of observations whose dummy variable equal to 0 are presented. For dummy 
variable i ^ O P r , the number of the early adopters (DV=1) and of the late adopters (DV=0) are reported. 
For variable LOSS, number of loss firms (DV=1) versus the profit firms (DV=0) are presented. For 
variable NQUA, number of non-qualifiers (DV=1) and qualifiers (DV=0) are reported. For variable 
MGC, number of firms with management change (r)V=l) and without management change (DV=0) are 
presented. 
® The mean and median of each continuous variable are reported by sample group A, B and C. 
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Table 6 Regression Results of Logistic Model for the Accounting Choice 
ADOPT 98 二 + a灿SS ,, + a,QUA 卯 + a.MGC ,, + a灿OE ,, + a.DER + a.SllE + s 
Equation (1.1) 
Sample A^ Sample B� Sample C� 
(n=735) (n=741) (n=798) 
Coef, ChiSq P>chi, Coef. ChiSq P>chi Coef, ChiSq P>chi 
Intercept -4.26 1.13 0.2873 -29.73 41.16 0.0001 -13.43 22.35 0.0001 
LOSS98 2.40 29.56 0.0001 3.45 32.13 0.0001 2.74 52.75 0.0001 
NQUA98 0.31 0.71 0.3980 1.90 21.59 0.0001 0.96 13.97 0.0002 
MGC98 0.84 7.95 0.0048 1.05 8.36 0.0038 0.92 15.10 0.0001 
細 E -0.54 0.68 0.4097 -0.45 0.26 0.6080 -0.39 0.67 0.4097 
DER -0.06 0.35 0.5534 -0.08 0.89 0.3464 -0.06 0.62 0.4310 
SIZE 0.05 0.06 0.7980 1.21 31.03 0.0001 0.51 13.61 0.0002 
Likefyhood 56.37 0.001 108.78 0.001 113.79 0.001 
Ratio^ - -
ADOPT98 二 1 for early adopters (A-share firms which adopted "Four Valuation Allowance" 
accounting policy in 1998) and 0 otherwise 
LOSSgs = dummy variable, 1 for loss firms in 1998 and 0 otherwise 
NQUAqs = dummy variable, 1 for nonqualifiers for rights offering in 1998 and 0 for qualifiers 
for rights offering 
MGCgs = dummy variable, 1 if there is management change in 1998 and 0 otherwise 
AROE= change of return on equity from 1997 to 1998 
DER= debt-equity ratio in 1998，total liability divided by equity 
SIZE = log of total assets in 1998 
a Early adopters only consist of firms which issue A-share in sample A group. 
b Early adopters consist of firms which issue both A-and B-shares or A- and H-shares in sample B group. 
° Early adopters include both firms with only A-share and firms with duel shares in sample C group, 
d Likelihood ratio test are performed to test the overall model fitness. 
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Table 7 Univariate Statistics and Correlation Analysis for Price Study 
Panel A: Univariate Statistics"" of Regression Variables 
Percentiles  
N Mean Sta. Dev. Median Q.3 
BVBB 726 0.57 1.65 -0.18 0.70 1.50 
BVB 726 0.43 1.71 -0.37 0.59 1.37 
BVFSA 726 2.53 1.57 1.40 2.19 3.20 
BVFSAO 726 2.52 1.57 1.39 2.19 3.19 
ALLN 726 0.15 0.21 0.03 0.07 0.17 
DIFA 726 0.14 0.21 0.03 0.07 0.17 
BVRA 726 0.13 0.19 0.03 0.07 0.16 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients among Independent Variables 
B ^ WB BVFSAODIFABVFSAALLN 
BVBB 0.99 -0.23 -0.71 -0.39 -0.71 -0.40 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BVB -0.34 -0.73 -0.46 -0.73 -0.47 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BVRA 0.36 0.68 0.36 0.68 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
BVFSAO 0.39 1.00 0.40 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DIFA 0.39 0.99 
(0.001) (0.001) 
BVFSA C.40 
(0,001) 
MVEt = market value of equity at the end of the fourth month in year t+1 ^ 
a Every variable is on the per-share basis. Total shares is utilized as the deflator in price study. 
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Table 7 Univariate Statistics and Correlation Analysis for Price Study 
(Continued) 
BVBBt =book value of equity before both effects, measured as book value of equity 
before retroactive adjustment and exclude net book value of four specified 
assets at year t 
BVBt 二 book value of equity before net book value of four specified assets at year t 
BVFSAt = reported gross book value of four specified assets at year t 
ALLNt = reported allowances for four specified assets at year t 
BVFSAOt 二 net book value of four specified assets under the old rule, assuming no 
accounting change at year t 
DIFAt = difference between the allowances for four specified assets under the new 
rule and those under the old rule at year t 
BVRAt = retroactive adjustment for beginning book value of equity at year t 
b Year t represents the year when the firm adopted "Four valuation allowances" policy. For early adopters 
t=1998; for late adopters, t=1999. 
43 
Table 8 Regression Results for Price Models 
i Panel A： Model (2.1) MKE,, = +a^BVFSA, +a^ALLN, +s 
； ^ ^ ^ ^ F value Adj, ( % ) ^ 
] F u l l sample ^ ^ ^ ^ 41.09*** 1 4 . 2 3 ^ 
7.56*** &65*** J0.7J 彻 -2.06** 
Early adopters 2.99 1.72 2.32 -5.19 11.05*** 23.68 103 
2.38** 3.61*** 5.3]*** -1.57 
\ Late adopters 9.58 2.15 3.21 -6.21 32.15*** 13.06 623 
趨 *** (5.(57*** -JJ4*** 
Single listing 8.49 2.40 3.34 -5.02 39.10*** 14.63 668 
請 *** 7.幻 *** iO.45*** -252*** 
丨 Multiple listing 2.69 1.44 1.57 1.83 3.05** 9.74 58 
7.75* 2 7J*** 2.93*** 0.48 
；P a n e l B: Model (2.3) MVE, a,BVB, + a^BVFSAO^ + a.DIFA, + s 
r, a. a. a. F value 
Adj. (%) N I 
Full sample . ^ ^ ^ ^ 41.09*** 
7.55*** S.67*** 10.70 稱 -2 力 3** 
Early adopters 2.98 1.73 2.32 -5.12 11.53*** 23.65 103 
235** i.^2*** 5.2P*** -1.55 
Late adopters 9.55 2.16 3.20 -6.11 32.08*** 13.04 623 
5.5(5*** (5.似 *** 9.37*** -i.25*** 
Single listing 8.49 2.40 3.34 -5.01 39.09*** 14.63 668 
7.^2*** 10.42""林 
Multiple listing 2.66 1.44 1.58 1.91 3.05** 9.73 58 
7.72* 2.75*** 2夕产 * 0.48 
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j Table 8 Regression Results for Price Models (continued) 
Panel C： Model (2.5) MVE,, 二��+ a,BVBB, + a^BVRA, + a,BVFSAO,^ + a.DIFA + s 
^ a. an oi-x F value Adj. (%) N 
Full sample ^ ^ ^ ^ -0.69 31.98*** 14.60 726 
氺** -3. OP*** i^Pi*** -0.30 
Early adopters 2.95 1.74 -1.09 2.28 -5.02 8.59*** 22.93 103 
2.55** -0.46 4.9(5*** -1.50 
Late adopters 9.55 2.17 -2.45 3.21 -5.92 24.03*** 12.90 623 
-0.75 9.27*** -2 力 4** 
Single listing 8.44 2.45 -6.68 3.43 -2.40 30.10*** 14.86 668 
‘ &45*** 7.96*** -2.(5^?*** -1.01 
：M u l t i p l e listing 2.79 1.40 -2.94 1.61 2.00 2.33* 8.52 58 
7.77* 25P*** -1.03 29(5*** 0.50 
rjt' 一 
***(**) (*) the two-tailed t-test is significant at the 1% (5%) (10%) level 
MVEt = market value of equity at the end of the fourth month in year t+1 
BVBBt =book value of equity before both effects, measured as book value of equity 
i before retroactive adjustment and exclude net book value of four specified 
assets at year t 
BVBt = book value of equity before net book value of four specified assets at year t 
BVFSAt = reported gross book value of four specified assets at year t 
ALLNt = reported allowances for four specified assets at year t 
BVFSAOt = net book value of four specified assets under the old rule, assuming no 
accounting change at year t 
DIFAt = difference between the allowances for four specified assets under the new 
rule and those under the old rule at year t 
Ij BVRAt 二 retroactive adjustment for beginning book value of equity at year t 
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Table 9 Univariate Statistics and Correlation Analysis for Annual Return Study 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis of Regression Variables 
Percentiles 
N Mean Sta. Dev. — ^ ^  
I T ! 0 ? m ^ -0.225 -0.006 
CEB 717 0.0001 0.026 -0.009 0.001 0.009 
EXPN 717 0.006 0.025 0.0002 0.001 0.003 
CEBO 717 -0.016 0.041 -0.026 -0.008 0.002 
DIFB 717 -0.010 0.032 -0.014 -0.004 -0.001 
BVRA 717 0.016 0.028 0.003 0.007 0.018 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Coefficients among Independent Variables 
CEm EXPN DIFB BVRA 
~~CEB ^ ^ ^ ^^^ ^ ^ 
(0.001) (0.015) - (0.014) (0.001) 
CEBO -0.08 0.48 -0.80 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.001) 
EXPN 0.99 0.22 
(0.001) (0.001) 
DIFB -069 
(0.001) 
RETt = market adjusted annual rate of return at year t, from beginning May of year t to end of 
April of year t+1 
CEBt = change of earnings before four specified expense and losses at year t 
CEBOt 二 change of earnings before four specified expense and losses under the old rule, 
assuming no accounting change, at year t 
EXPNt = four expenses and losses reported in year t 
DIFBt 二 difference between estimated amount of four specified expenses under the old rule 
assuming no accounting method change and actually reported amount under the new 
rule 
BVRAt = cumulative retroactive adjustment of book value of equity at year t 
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Table 10 Regression Results for Annual Return Study 
Panel A: Model (2.2) RET, = PfEB, + P^EXPN, + s 
J , A A F V a l u e A d j . (%) N 
Full sample ^ ^ ^ 32.55*** 8.10 ^ 
7.52*** 7.似 *** -1.88"" 
Early adopters 0.05 1.48 0.31 1.96 2.26 84 
1.96* 1.74* 0.35 
Late adopters 0.19 9.54 -3.99 38.74*** 10.67 633 
7.i5*** 氺氺 * 
Single listing 0.19 7.55 -2.08 32.56*** 8.69 664 
7•站 *** 
Multiple listing 0.02 0.38 -0.41 0.10 -3.57 53 
0.58 0.24 -0.23 
Panel B: Model (2.4) RET] = A + PiCEBO, + fi^DIFB, + s 
“ J , A A F V a l u e A d j . (%) N 
Full sample ^ ^ 32.60*** 8.11 717 
7.53*** 7. <55*** -1.88"" 
Early adopters 0.05 1.47 0.29 1.95 2.24 84 
1.97* 1.73* 0.34 
Late adopters 0.19 9.56 -3.99 38.79*** 10.68 633 
7.7(5*** 請 *** -3.4(5*** 
Single listing 0.19 7.57 -2.08 32.60*** 8.70 664 
7.37*** 7.(55*** 
Multiple listing 0.02 0.39 -0.39 0.10 -3.57 53 
0.58 0.25 -0.22 
* 
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Table 10 Regression Results for Annual Return Study (continued) 
Panel C: Model (2.6) RET, = PfEBO, + P^DIFB, + I5^BVRA + s 
A A A F Value Adj.R2(%) 
Full sample o l 9 ^ T m ^ 21.84*** ^ 
狄 *** 7.47*** -7.70* -0.62 
Early adopters 0.05 1.48 0.30 0.02 1.28 1.02 84 
7.77* 1.60 0.34 0.05 
Late adopters 0.22 9.43 -3.58 -1.89 26.68*** 10.86 633 
(5.5P*** -3 力 3*** -1.52 
Single listing 0.20 7.43 -1.93 -0.76 21.93*** 8.65 664 
7.44*** -1.89"" -0.80 
Multiple listing 0.01 0.46 -0.83 0.61 0.12 -5.36 53 
0.34 0.30 -0.39 0.39 
*** (**) (*) the two-tailed t-test is significant at the 1% (5%) (10%) level 
RETt = market adjusted annual rate of return at year t, from beginning May of year t to end of 
April of year t+1 
CEBt 二 change of earnings before four specified expense and losses at year t 
CEBOt = change of earnings before four specified expense and losses under the old rule, 
assuming no accounting change, at year t 
EXPNt = four expenses and losses reported in year t 
DIFBt 二 difference between estimated amount of four specified expenses under the old rule 
assuming no accounting method change and actually reported amount under the new 
rule 
BVRAt 二 cumulative retroactive adjustment of book value of equity at year t 
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Appendix 1: 
Evolution of "Four Valuation Allowances，，Policy 
Jan. 1998 Jan. 1999 
X X • 
MOF No. 7 MOF No. 35&49 
Before MOFNo.7: 
No requirements on valuation allowances were allowed for short-term and long-term 
investments and inventories before 1998, and the allowance for doubtful accounts was limited 
to the range of 0.3-0.5% of the total accounts receivable 
MOF, NO, 7: 
Accounting System for Shareholding Companies: Accounts and Financial Statements: firms 
listed in overseas and those issued H-shares and B-shares to select methods and percentages of 
allowances for the four specified assets, yet A-share companies are allowed to follow this 
policy voluntarily 
MOF，No.35 &N0.49: 
Supplementary Provision of Accounting System for Shareholding Companies: Accounts and 
Financial Statements: all shareholding companies are mandated to follow this "Four Valuation 
Allowances" policy. Retroactive method is allowed to record the cumulative effects of these 
valuation allowance adjustments. 
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Appendix 1: 
Current PRC GAAP on four specified assets accounts 
Account Receivables and Other Receivables: 
• Firms can select the method and percentage of making allowances for bad debts. 
• The method and percentage cannot be changed discretionarily once they are chosen. 
• Footnote is required if firms change the original method and percentage. 
Inventory: 
• The allowance for market reduction of inventory equals the difference which the 
inventory value is lower than the cost in annual or interim inventory taking due to 
various reasons such as inventory shortage, spoilage, obsolescence and sale price below 
cost. 
Short-term Investment: 
• Short-term investments should be carried at the lower of cost or market value at the end 
of each period. 
• Any reduction of cost to market value should be recognized as an investment loss in the 
current period. 
• When the value of current investments for which a loss on decline in value has 
previously been recognized recovers, the recovery should be recognized as income to 
the extent that it reverses the amount of investment loss previously recognized. 
Lons-term Investment: 
• An enterprise should periodically review the carrying amount of long-term investments 
on an individual item basis. 
• If the recoverable amount of any investment is lower than the carrying amount of that 
investment as a result of a continuing decline in market value or changes in operating 
conditions of the investee enterprise, the difference between the recoverable amount 
and the carrying amount of the investment should initially be offset against any capital 
surplus relating to that investment. 
• Any remaining difference which is in excess of the capital surplus attributable to that 
investment should be recognized as an investment loss in the current period. 
• When the value of a long-term investment for which a loss has been recognized 
previously recovers, the recovery should be recognized to the extent of the amount of 
the investment loss previously recognized.  
Source: Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises, Jan 2000. 
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